Friday, November 26, 2010

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Introduction of Hazard Identification:
Safety risk assessment is one of the processes in a Safety Management System (SMS) and an important element of the safety risk assessment is the identification of hazards.

A hazard can be considered as a dormant potential for harm which is present in one form or another within the aviation system or its environment. This potential for harm may be in the form of a natural hazard such as terrain, or a technical hazard such as wrong runway markings.

The use of the term ‘hazard’ in the formal risk assessment context originated in the nuclear and chemical industries for which a wide range of different types of ‘hazards’ are present all of the time .The ‘control’ of these hazards (containment, separation etc.) and the ‘mitigation’ of their consequences (gas detection, plant shutdown etc.) should a failure condition arise is the subject of safety risk assessment and safety risk management processes.

A condition, object, activity or event with the potential of causing injuries to personnel, damage to equipment or structures, loss of material, or reduction of ability to perform a prescribed function.

Safety risk assessment is one of the functions in a Safety Management System and an important element of safety risk assessment is the identification of hazards.

A hazard can be considered as a dormant potential for harm which is present in one form or another within the aviation system or its environment. This potential for harm may be in the
form of a natural hazard such as terrain, or a technical hazard such as wrong runway
markings.
An SMS is a systematic and organised approach to managing safety, including the necessary
organisational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures. The component of SMS
within which hazards identification takes place is safety risk assessment and this forms part of
an overall safety risk management process.
Safety risk assessment can be performed on steady-state operations to provide assurance that
the risks associated with day-to-day operations remain tolerably safe. It can also be performed
on proposed changes to a system or operation to ensure that the risks from any additional
hazards or any impacts on existing hazards, introduced by the change remain acceptably safe.
Safety risk assessment features 8 steps:
1. System / operation description
2. Hazards identification processes
3. Consequence analysis
4. Causal analysis
5. Evaluation of risk
6. Mitigation of risk
7. Approval of residual risk
8. Safety assessment documentation

Fig1: Definition of hazard identification

Risk Controls (Barriers and Mitigation)
A system, activity, action or procedure that is put in place to reduce the risks associated with a
hazard. Mitigation may include:
• elimination of the hazard (preferred),
• reduction in the frequency of the hazard (barriers),
• reduction in the likelihood of the outcomes of the hazard (outcome mitigation),
• reduction of the severity of the outcomes of the hazard (consequence mitigation).

Risk
The combination of the predicted frequency and severity of the consequences of hazard(s)
taking into account all of the potential outcomes.
Safety Risk Management
The identification of hazards associated with the day-to-day operations of an organisation, or
associated with changes to the operations of an organisation; the assessment of the risks
associated with those hazards; and the implementation and management of measures to
reduce those risks to an acceptable level (hazard removal; or the application of barriers and/or
mitigations – i.e. risk control).
The above definitions are illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 1 which is referred to in some
literature as a Bow-Tie diagram. ‘Bow-tie’ also refers to the methodology used to build
such diagram. Some examples of the use of the terminology are also provided in Tables 1 to 4.
The method for building a bow-tie involves asking a structured set of questions in a logical
sequence. The completed Bow-Tie illustrates the hazard, the undesirable event, the safety
events and potential outcomes, and the risk controls put in place to minimise the risk.
Risk management is about controlling risks. This is done by placing barriers to prevent certain
undesirable events from happening. A control can be any measure taken that acts against
some undesirable force or intention, in order to maintain a desired state. In the Bow-Tie
methodology there are preventive or proactive barriers (on the left side of the Undesirable
Event) that prevent the Undesirable Event from happening. There are also corrective or
reactive controls (on the right side of the Undesirable Event) that prevent the Undesirable
Event from resulting into unwanted Outcomes or reduce the consequence severity of the
Outcomes.

3 Hazards identification in Practice
Hazards may be identified through a data-driven (quantitative) methodology or qualitative
process such as discussions, interviews and brainstorming.
3.1 Data Driven Methodologies
In a data-driven approach, hazards are identified and recorded through a systematic process
which allows for traceability and further analysis.
There are various types of recorded observations which may be used to identify hazards.
Sources for hazards identification can be Flight Data Monitoring (FDM), company audits,
staff surveys, hazard reports and others. Investigation and reports of past occurrences
may provide rich material as to existing hazards as well as, alternative to these, hazards which
may arise. For example, an occurrence report may identify the hazard of standing water
affecting the integrity of landing aid equipment at an airport, but through this report other
hazards which may affect this equipment may also be identified.
Furthermore, real-time and non real-time simulations may be used to identify likely hazards
and their interactions. Using simulation modelling it
may be easier to identify potential hazards and their potential outcomes.
3.2 Qualitative Methodologies
Hazards may be identified through a qualitative process, either formal (part of safety
assessment) or informal based on discussions, interviews and brainstorming. Informal
qualitative methodologies are heuristic processes based on expert judgement. They often allow
identifying hazards that other approaches can’t detect. Using both approaches in combination
will provide better and more comprehensive results.
Within published literature, it is recognised that hazards identification must be done
methodically in order to ensure that all areas of operation where hazards may exist have been
identified. It is recommended that among others; design, organisational, work environment
factors, as well as procedures and operating practices are taken into account in the
identification process.
Existing material should be reviewed with the aim of identifying gaps or hazards. The UK CAA
suggests a brainstorming exercise, which will allow participants to
identify hazards within the organisation. The hazard control Toolbox
suggests that the identification of the hazards may be
done by individual or group-based assessors.
The main challenge for individual and group-based brainstorming sessions involves the
identification of hazards which exist but are difficult to think of. Some approaches have been
developed to cover what might be termed ‘unimaginable hazards’.

Unimaginable Hazards

One of the most common ways of identifying hazards other than from occurrence reports is to
conduct functional hazard assessments. In such functional hazard assessments, failures of
prescribed or intended system functions or operational procedures, the operational
consequences of these failures, and the potential effects on the safety of the operation are
identified. It is however a well established fact that some hazards are hard or even impossible
to identify using functional hazard identification sessions. Such hazards are called
unimaginable hazards.
One reason why not all hazards may be identified through a functional approach is that there
may be hazards associated with a system functioning well, for example when operators
become overly reliant on a well-functioning alerting system. Another reason is that some
hazards may not be associated with functional failures, such as those associated with
situational awareness problems. Also, sometimes functions relevant for the safety of the
operations are implicit and go unnoticed, or the available description of the system or
operation involved is otherwise not complete.
This means that, in order to get a complete picture of the relevant hazards, “logical thinking”
from the functional failure point of view must be enhanced by creative input of operational
experts. Such input is obtained through hazard identification brainstorming sessions that are
designed, organised and conducted in a specific manner. Guidance for such hazard
identification brainstorming sessions may be found.
Getting an as complete as possible overview of the relevant hazards is essential of course, as
the risks associated with hazards that go unnoticed, cannot be managed.

4 Specific Tools and Techniques for Hazards Identification
This section provides a summary of a number of tools and techniques that can be used for
hazards identification. The various techniques are described below together with a brief
overview of their advantages and disadvantages.
It should be remembered that any system or operation comprises:
• people;
• procedures;
• equipment; and
• an environment of operation
All these elements must be considered during hazards identification.
Hazards identification techniques require a definition of the System / Operation, its
environment of operation and its interactions to have been completed prior to undertaking the
task (safety risk assessment Step 1: System/Operation description). This System / Operation
definition may take different forms depending on the specific technique and type of system.
The definition may be:
• Functional
• Operational
• Process
• Scenario based
4.1 Brainstorming
Brainstorming is an unbounded but facilitated discussion within a group of experts. A
facilitator prepares prompts or issues ahead of the group session and then encourages
imaginative thinking and discussion between group members during the session. The
facilitator initiates a thread of discussion and there are no rules as to what is in or out of scope
from the subsequent discussion. All contributions are accepted and recorded and no view is
challenged or criticised. This provides an environment in which the experts feel comfortable in
thinking laterally.
Advantages
• Good for identifying new hazards in novel systems.
• Involves all key stakeholders.
• Relatively quick and easy to undertake.
• Can be applied to a wide range of types of systems.
Disadvantages
• Relatively unstructured and therefore not necessarily comprehensive.
• Depends on the expertise and profile of the participants
• May be susceptible to the influence of group dynamics.
• Can rely heavily on the skills of the facilitator for success.
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study
HAZOP is a systematic and structured approach using parameter and deviation guidewords.
The technique relies on a very detailed system description being available for study and
usually involves breaking down the system into well defined subsystems and
functional or process flows between subsystems. Each element of the system is then
subjected to discussion within a multidisciplinary group of experts against the various
combinations of the guidewords and deviations.
The group discussion is facilitated by a Chairman and the results of the discussion recorded by
a Secretary together including any hazards identified when a particular guideword and
deviation combination is discussed. Where a particular guideword and deviation combination
does not produce any hazards, or is not thought credible, this should also be recorded to
demonstrate completeness.
The guidewords and deviations must be prepared in advance by the HAZOP Chairman and may
need to be tailored to the system or operation being studied.
In an aviation context, typical guidewords might include:
• Detection
• Co-ordination
• Notification
• Transmission
• Clearance
• Authorisation
• Selection
• Transcription
• Turn
• Climb
• Descend
• Speed
• Read-back
• Monitoring
• Signage
• Handover
• Supervision
Typical deviations might include:
• Too soon / early
• Too late
• Too much
• Too little
• Too high
• Too low
• Missing
• Twice / repeated
• Out of sequence

• Ambiguous
• Reverse / inverted
Advantages
• Systematic and rigorous.
• Involves interaction of views from multidisciplinary experts.
• Can be applied to a wide range of types of system.
• Creates a detailed and auditable record of the hazards identification process.
Disadvantages
• Requires a considerable amount of preparation.
• Can rely heavily on the skills of the HAZOP Chairman
• Can be time consuming and therefore expensive.
• Can inhibit imaginative thinking and so certain kinds of hazards.

Future Hazards Identification through the FAST method
Identification of future hazards often relies on expert judgement and some sort of
‘instrumented’ brainstorming.
There are only few methods available for future hazards identification. The method developed
by the Future Aviation Safety Team (FAST) is one of these. This team created by the JSSI is
now associated to ECAST, the commercial aviation safety team of the ESSI.
The FAST method (Ref. 8 - FAST method) is a “prognostic” or “predictive” approach
aimed at discovering future hazards arising as a consequence of future changes
introduced inside or outside the global aviation system and of their interaction, and
subsequently develop and implement mitigating actions.
The FAST team has built and maintains a list of 200+ Areas of Changes (AoCs) affecting the
global Aviation and ATM system. This list is used for identification of future hazards.
This list can be augmented by a more specific list of changes identified by the method user
(airline, ANSP, maintenance organisation, manufacturer, authority, etc.) that specifically
affects its activities. A list of local changes is likely to feature proprietary information regarding
for instance new market strategy, new organisation, new staff policy, opening of a new route,
etc., depending on the method user’s profile.

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
FMEA is a ‘bottom up’ technique that is used to consider ways in which the basic
components of a system can fail to perform their design intent. This could either be at
an equipment level or at a functional level. The technique relies on a detailed system
description and considers the ways in which each sub-component of the system could fail to
meet its design intent and what the consequences would be on the overall system.
For each sub-component of a system an FMEA considers:
• All the potential ways that the component could fail.
• The effects that each of these failures would have on the system behaviour.
• The possible causes of the various failure modes.
• How the failures might be mitigated within the system or its environment.

Behaviours at the system level arising from the sub-component failures which have a safety
consequence are thus identified as hazards. The system level at which the analysis is applied
can vary and is determined by the level of detail of the system description used to support the
analysis. Depending on the nature and complexity of the system, the analysis could be
undertaken by an individual system expert or by a team of system experts acting in group
session.


Advantages
• Systematic and rigorous.
• Creates a detailed and auditable record of the hazards identification process.
• Can be applied to a wide range of types of system.
Disadvantages
• Only really considers hazards arising from single point failure modes rather than
combinations of failures.
• Relies on people with detailed system knowledge.
• Can be time consuming and expensive.

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